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THE EFFECTS OF THE 200-MILE UNITED STATES
FISHING ZONE
Marine fishery resources situated on the high seas are categorized by
economists as "common property resources."' Such resources can be
simultaneously exploited by a large number of individuals, no one of
whom can acquire an exclusive right to the catch.2 There is no incentive
among fishermen to refrain from exploiting the fish stock since anything
one fisherman leaves will be taken by other producers. As long as a
positive economic profit exists, the incentive to enter the industry will also
exist. 3 With no controls, the fish stock will become depleted and the
industry economically inefficient.4 Obviously, some restrictions and regu-
lations must be imposed on the high seas fisheries through national or
international fishery management plans.
Differences arise over the proper goals of a management program.5
Economists take the position that more effort should be applied to the
harvesting of a particular stock only if the value of the extra fish caught is
equal to the value of the extra effort. 6 In this view, no production should
take place beyond the point where the marginal cost of capturing the fish
equals their selling price. This economic equilibrium is known as max-
imum economic yield.7
1. F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMONWEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 1-16
(1965) [hereinafter cited as CHRISTY & SCOTT]; Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
2. CHRISTY & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 1-16.
3. Gordon, supra note 1, at 128-35; Scott, The Fisheries: The Objectives of
Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116, 117 (1955).
4. Gould, Extinction of a Fishery by Commercial Exploitation, 80 J. POL.
ECON. 1031 (1972); Smith, On Models of Commercial Fishing, 77 J. POL. ECON. 181
(1969).
5. J. GULLAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES (1974).
6. CHRISTY & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 221-30; Anderson, Economic Aspects of
Fisheries Utilization in Law of the Sea Negotiation, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 656, 659
(1974); Turvey, Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation, 54 AM.
ECON. REV. 64 (1974).
7. Anderson, Criteria for Maximum Economic Yield of an Internationally
Exploited Fishery, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 159
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Biologists generally consider the actual physical yield of the fishery
more important than the labor and capital inputs and favor fishing a stock
to the point beyond which further exploitation would decrease the biologi-
cal yield.8 This biological equilibrium or maximum sustainable yield
ensures a long term food supply from the ocean provided there are no
marked changes in the environment or other factors that affect fish migrat-
ory or reproductive habits. Unfortunately, these two objectives will gener-
ally be mutually exclusive since the point of maximum economic yield in a
fishery is at a lower level of effort and catch than that of maximum
sustainable yield.9
Whatever the management objective, the tremendous increase in
fishing after World War II clearly demonstrated the need for fisheries
conservation. Total world catch increased from 10 million metric tons in
1930 to 68 million metric tons by 196810 as the demand for fish increased
due to world population growth, increased per capita consumption in the
developed countries and the use of fish as an intermediate product, fish
meal." In addition, new technological developments such as processing
and freezing at sea, improved synthetic webbing in net fishing, and the
introduction of more frozen fish products added to the overfishing prob-
lem. 12
The technological and population changes that created the need for
fisheries conservation also demonstrated the inadequacy of the historically
developed rules for ocean use and the necessity for increased regulation in
all phases of ocean exploration. An immediate answer to the overfishing
problem was sought through the formation of regional commissions and
conventions.' 3 Among the early attempts at sound fisheries management
(H. Knight ed. 1975); Crutchfield, An Economic View of Optimum Sustainable
Yield, in OPTIMuM SUSTAINABLE YIELD AS A CONCEPT IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
(P. Roedel ed. 1975).
8. D. CUSHING, FISHERIES BIOLOGY, A STUDY IN POPULATION DYNAMICS
77-106 (1968).
9. Schaefer, Biological and Economic Aspects of the Management of Marine
Fisheries, 88 TRANS. AM. FISH. Soc. 100 (1959).
10. Chapman, The Theory and Practice of International Fishery Development-
Management, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 408, 414 (1970).
11. CHRISTY & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 17-55.
12. Chapman, supra note 10, at 414-15.
13. Convention Between the United States of America and Canada for the
Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea,
5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900 (in force Oct. 28, 1953); International Convention for
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1 U.N.T. 477, T.I.A.S. 2059 (in force July 3, 1950).
For a chronology of fisheries treaties and agreements see A. KOERS, INTERNATIONal
REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES 77 (1973).
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was the effort of the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
which produced four conventions. 14 Although the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas was ultimately
adopted by 34 nations, no nation ever implemented the fishery manage-
ment plan it envisioned developing.
The Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was expressly
called in i960 to consider two of the issues left unresolved in 1958-the
breadth of the territorial sea and the interests of coastal states in the fishery
resources off their coast.' 5 No agreements were reached at this meeting,
and the compromise measure of a six-mile territorial sea with a further
six-mile exclusive fishing zone was defeated by one vote. 16
The inability to resolve these key issues coupled with further popula-
tion growth and technological change made some provisions of the 1958
agreements obsolete and gave rise to the Third United Nations Conference
on Law of the Sea. 17 After four substantive sessions, the Third Law of the
Sea Conference has failed to produce a comprehensive treaty, and the
polarized national positions have not been significantly modified in several
important areas.' 8 In addition to the difficulty of reaching consensus
among 140 nations, the slow progress at the Conference has been due to
complex social, economic, and political factors that are an integral part of
ocean and non-ocean issues as well as the ideological split between the
industrial nations and the developing countries. 19 In an attempt to hasten
the negotiating process, the Geneva session of the Conference adopted a
single negotiating text around which to center further compromise, discus-
14. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969 (in force March 20,
1966); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Continguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S.
205, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (in force Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on the
Continental Shelf, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (in force
June 10, 1964); Convention on the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (in force Sept. 30, 1962) [herein'after cited as Convention on the
High Seas].
15. Knight, International Fisheries Management: A Background Paper, in THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 1, 6-8 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Knight].
16. Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for
Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L. L. 751 (1960).
17. United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 2750-C (Dec. 17, 1970).
18. Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce on the Geneva Session of the 3d United Nations Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Geneva
Session].
19. Id. at 4-5.
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sion, and debate. This negotiating text was revised at the spring 1976
meeting held in New York. Though it does not reflect agreement, parts of
it do reflect the dominant trends in the negotiations--especially with
respect to fisheries and the exclusive economic zone.
The Revised Single Negotiating Text-A Summary
The articles of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (R.S.N.T.)
accept the principle of freedom of the high seas.2' Among those freedoms
specifically enumerated is freedom of fishing to be enjoyed "with due
consideration for the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas. .. ."2 The proposed 200-mile exclusive
economic zone wherein the coastal state would have the "sovereign
rights" to explore and conserve the resources 22 would result in a much
smaller area available for high seas fishing. Within the exclusive
economic zone, the coastal state would determine the allowable fish catch
which should be established to ensure maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
modified only by environmental and economic factors.23 The coastal state
would also be responsible for designating the portion of the MSY reserved
exclusively for its domestic fishermen. 24 Once these figures have been
established, the coastal state would be obligated to give other nations
access to any excess of MSY over the allocated domestic catch.25 In
theory, this would create a preferential rather than an exclusive fishing
zone, but in reality the distinction would be illusory since decisions on
catch limits, domestic fishing capacity, and surplus would be made entire-
ly by the coastal state on the basis of its best scientific information. 26
Foreign fishing access to the zone could be conditioned on compliance
with numerous regulations established solely by the coastal state including
licensing, fees, technological compensation, gear restrictions, quotas, and
seasonal and area limits. 27 The coastal state would also have control of
pollution regulations and exclusive jurisdiction over installations, artificial
islands, scientific research and any other economic exploitations.28
20. Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, Revised Single
Negotiating Text, art. 76, U.N. Doc. A/C. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1 pt. 11 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as R.S.N.T.]. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 14.
21. R.S.N.T. art. 76.
22. Id. art. 45.
23. Id. art. 50.
24. Id. art. 51.
25. Id.
26. Id. arts. 50 & 51.
27. Id. art. 51.
28. Id. art. 44.
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The foundation of the conservation provisions is international cooper-
ation and mutual agreement among interested nations for each of the five
categories of fish-anadromous, 29 coastal,30 sedentary, 3' catadromous ,32
and highly migratory.33 For example, nations fishing for highly migratory
species would be instructed to cooperate to promote the "optimum utiliza-
tion" of the species both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone. 34 Similarly when coastal species are found in several economic
zones or both within and beyond a zone, the states involved would be
instructed to use regional and subregional organizations to arrive at a
consensus on management techniques.35 Conservation measures for anad-
romous species would be the responsibility of the state of origin, and
fishing should be conducted only within this state's economic zone unless
economic dislocation would result. 36 Beyond the 200-mile zone, however,
anadromous regulations could be enforced only by agreement among the
interested nations. Coastal states where the catadromous species spend
most of their life cycle would have regulatory authority and fishing should
be conducted only in the zones of these states. 3 Where migration occurs
through several different zones there must be agreement on the conserva-
tion guidelines by the regulatory states if uniform control is to be achieved.
The ambiguity in these guidelines for fishery management results from
trying to formulate rules agreeable to 140 nations and applicable to
numerous diverse fish stocks.
Fishing for sedentary species continues under the regime adopted in
1958 at the First Law of the Sea Conference which gives the coastal state
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting [continental
29. Anadromous species are fish-that spend the greatest part of their life cycle
on the high seas coming inland to fresh water only to spawn. See Knight, supra 15,
at 33.
30. Coastal species stay at all times within 200 miles of shore. Thus, their
migratory cycle occurs within the boundaries of a single state or two or more states.
31. Sedentary species are defined by the Convention on the Continental Shelf
as organisms which at the harvestable state are either immobile on or under the
seabed or unable to move except in physical contact with the seabed or subsoil. Art.
2(4), 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (1965).
32. Catadromous species spend the greater part of their life cycle in fresh water
but travel to marine water to spawn.
33. Highly migratory species such as tuna are usually found thousands of miles
from the coast and thus outside the jurisdiction of any nation. See Knight supra
note 15, at 34-35.
34. R.S.N.T. art. 53.
35. Id. art. 52.
36. Id. art. 55.
37. Id. art. 56.
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shelf] natural resources."38 Whereas under the R.S.N.T. the coastal states
in theory could be obligated to admit foreign fishing for certain types of
species, the regime governing sedentary species would accord the coastal
state exclusive jurisdiction.
A nation's rights in its exclusive economic zone could be subject to
special sharing provisions for geographically handicapped or underde-
veloped countries. Landlocked states could exploit the fishery resources of
adjoining states on terms established in regional agreements.39 Developing
coastal states heavily dependent on the living resources under the control
of neighboring states would be given access to exclusive economic zones
in their region. 4°
The two substantive sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference in
New York in 1976 failed to produce a treaty. The final session of the
Conference will be held May-June of 1977 with the R.S.N.T. providing
the basis for further negotiations. Conference observers are fairly equally
divided between those who predict the successful negotiation of a com-
prehensive treaty at this session and those who foresee a continued lack of
consensus.
B ackground of the United States 200-Mile Fishing Zone
The Caracas and Geneva Law of the Sea sessions clearly demon-
strated that any treaty dealing with fishery management would provide
some type of 200-mile zone. Recognizing this eventuality might be de-
layed for years by the negotiations, Congress made its first serious attempt
to extend the United States fishery jurisdiction in 1974. In the Senate three
committees-Commerce, 41 Foreign Relations, 42 and Armed Services43 -
held hearings on a 200-mile fishing bill. Only the Foreign Relations
Committee reported the legislation unfavorably." The Foreign Relations
Committee concluded that such unilateral action would: (1) encourage
broad claims by other nations, (2) damage United States security interests,
38. CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. art. 2.
39. R.S.N.T. art. 58.
40. Id. art. 59.
41. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce on S. 380, S. 1988, and S. 2388, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 380, S. 1988, and S. 2388].
42. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on S. 1988, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
43. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services on S. 1988, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1988].
44. S. REP. No. 1166, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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(3) disrupt United States relations with distant water fishing nations like
Japan and the Soviet Union, (4) risk serious confrontations as in the
Iceland-United Kingdom fishery dispute, (5) create an area impossible to
police without acceptance by the international community, and (6) be
inconsistent with United States legal obligations under other bilateral and
multilateral fishery agreements.45 Despite the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee's report and opposition to the bill by the Departments of State and
Defense, the Senate passed the bill on December 11, 1974, by 68-27. 46
The House also held hearings on a similar proposal, 47 but failed to take a
floor vote before the end of the 93rd Congress.
Efforts to implement a 200-mile zone were renewed in 1975 with
hearings on H.R. 200 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries in March of 1975.48 Senate Committees on
Commerce, 49 Foreign Relations, 50 and Armed Services5' also held hear-
ings on a bill designed to extend the United States fishery zone, S. 961.
Again, the Foreign Relations Committee filed the only unfavorable report,
citing many of the same reasons for its opposition as in its 1974 report. 52
H.R. 200 passed the House by a vote of 208-101 on October 9, 1975, 51
and S. 961 passed the Senate on January 28, 1976 by a vote of 77-19. 51
The Senate and House both passed the Conference Committee's compro-
mise bill, 55 and the act was signed into law, April 13, 1976.56
45. Id. at 4,
46. 32 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 3348 (Dec. 14, 1974).
47. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on
Extending the Jurisdiction of the United States Beyond the Present Twelve Mile
Fishery Zone, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment].
48. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R.
200 et al., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
49. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce on S. 961,94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 961].
50. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and International Environment
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
51. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services on S. 961, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings Before Armed Services
Comm. on S. 961].
52. S. REP. No. 459, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
53. 33 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2202 (Oct. 11, 1975.).
54. 34 id. at 248 (Jan. 31, 1976).
55. Id. at 750-51 (Apr. 3, 1976).
56. Id. at 937 (Apr. 17, 1976).
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The impetus for an expansion of the United States' fishing zone had
been developing for a number of years in part due to declining profits and
productivity in the United States coastal fishing industry. 7 Large scale
foreign fishing operations were blamed for the overfishing problem and
the depletion of 11 to 14 fish stocks off the United States coast."8 Further
the international fisheries agreements established to control the overfishing
problem had proven ineffective and were not uniformly or stringently
enforced.5 9 The realization that 20 percent of all marine fisheries in
temperate and subarctic shelf areas of the world were located off the
United States' coast' lead to the recognition of the fisheries as one of the
United States' most valuable resources. These considerations called for
immediate conservation measures, but hopes for a negotiation of a com-
prehensive Law of the Sea Treaty establishing a unified management plan
diminished after the Caracas and Geneva sessions of the Conference. The
growing consensus in Congress was that there was no evidence of any real
progress towards accomplishing an international agreement. 6 1 As a solu-
tion Congress enacted the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of
1976 which was signed into law by President Ford on April 13, 1976.
Summary of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act
TITLE I-FISHERY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES
The first title of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act
(FCMA) establishes a fishery conservation zone extending seaward from
the baseline of the territorial sea for 200 miles. 62 Exclusive management
authority is claimed by the United States over all fish within this zone, and
beyond 200 miles over all continental shelf species and over those anad-
romous species not within another nation's territorial sea or economic
zone. 63 No exclusive management claim is made for highly migratory
species. 64 Enforcement of these provisions was delayed until March 1,
1977.65
57. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment, supra note 47, at 9.
58. S. REP. No. 1079, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974). The fish stock damaged or
threatened include: haddock, herring, mackerel menhaden (Atlantic not Gulf),
sabelfish, shrimp (Pacific), yellowtail flounder, and halibut. Id.
59. Id. No. 416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1975).
60. Id. at 11.
61. 121 CONG. REC. H9914 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan).
62. Fishery Conservation and Management Act, § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FCMA].
63. Id. § 102, 16 U.S.C. § 1812.
64. Id. § 103, 16 U.S.C. § 1813. See note 33, supra.
65. Id. § 104, 16 U.S.C. § 1811.
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TITLE II-FOREIGN FISHING AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Despite the adoption of the act, foreign fishing in the United States
zone can continue under fishery agreements in effect on the date the act
was passed if the agreements have not expired or been renegotiated. 66
However, the Secretary of State is directed to renegotiate promptly all
fishery agreements inconsistent with the act, and it is the "sense of
Congress" that the United States should withdraw according to treaty
provisions if the agreement is not renegotiated in a reasonable time. 67
The only other foreign citizens eligible to fish for the resources under
United States control will be those from nations negotiating a "governing
internation fishery agreement" (GIFA) with the United States68 who
subsequently apply for a permit.69 The governing agreement will outline
the basic framework of legal order with which the nation and its vessels
must comply, and is a prerequisite for permit applications. Each governing
agreement must contain an acknowledgement of the United States' exclu-
sive management authority, acceptance by the nation and its vessels of all
conservation regulations, and provisions for the boarding, search, and
seizure of any vessel when there is probable cause to believe a violation
has occurred, and assumption of responsibility for reimbursing United
States citizens for damage or loss to their vessel, gear, or catch caused by a
foreign nation's vessel. 70 Further, the nation must promise to develop
domestic regulations to ensure that each fisherman complies with the
specific provisions of his permit. 7' The Secretary of State is responsible
for negotiating GIFAs subject to Congressional disapproval within 60
days. 72 Congress amended the FCMA to provide a one time only waiver of
the 60-day period Congress has to review the GIFAs, the 45 days the
regional councils can take to study them, and the requirement that a permit
be in the wheelhouse of the vessel. 73
Foreign fishermen will be allowed only that part of the optimum
66. Id. § 201(a),(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(a),(b).
67. Id. § 202(a)(1),(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1),(b).
68. Id. § 201(a),(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(a),(c).
69. Id. §§ 201(a), 204, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a), 1824.
70. Id. § 201(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c).
71. Id. § 201(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c).
72. Id. §§ 202, 203, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1822, 1823. No agreement is valid until 60 days
after it is transmitted to Congress thus giving Congress the opportunity to pass a
joint fishery resolution prohibiting the U.S. from entering the agreement. Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 95-6, 91 Stat. 14 (1977).
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yield74 not taken by United States vessels and this allotment is discretion-
ary, not mandatory. 75 The Secretaries of State and Commerce are to
determine the allocation of this portion among eligible foreign nations by
considering each nation's traditional fishing activities, cooperation with
the United States in fishery research, identification, and conservation, or
any other appropriate factors. 76 However, no foreign fishing will be
allowed if the nation does not extend the same fishing privileges to United
States vessels.
77
To take advantage of a foreign fishery allocation each nation that is a
party to a GIFA must apply to the Secretary of State for a permit for each
fishing vessel. The application must specify the particular vessel to which
the permit applies, describe its gear, processing equipment, and the type
and amount of fish to be caught. 78 The application will be published in the
Federal Register and transmitted to the Secretary of Commerce, the
appropriate regional councils, and House and Senate subcommittees. 79
After considering comments on the application, the Secretary of Com-
merce may approve it and establish the restrictions and operating condi-
tions to be followed.80 Upon disapproval the Secretary of State shall notify
the nation of the reasons for the rejection; the nations may then submit a
revised application.8" Payment of fees by the fishing vessel will be re-
quired in accordance with a schedule applying nondiscriminatorily to all
foreign nations. 82
If a foreign vessel has been used to commit a prohibited act or if any
civil or criminal penalty assessed remains unpaid, the Secretary of Com-
merce has the power to revoke, suspend, or impose further conditions on
the permit. 83 Upon notice of (1) a violation of an existing international
fishing agreement, (2) seizure of a United States vessel as the result of an
unrecognized jurisdictional claim, or (3) the failure of the United States to
74. The FCMA defines optimum yield as the amount of fish-'"(A) which will
provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular reference to food
production and recreational opportunities; and (B) which is prescribed as such on
the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any
relevant economic, social, or ecological factor."
75. FMCA § 201(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d).
76. Id. § 201(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e).
77. Id. § 201(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(f).
78. Id. § 204(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b).
79. Id., 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b).
80. Id., 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b).
81. Id. § 204(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b).
82. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,925 (1976).
83. FMCA § 204(b)(11), 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b)(11).
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negotiate access to a foreign exclusive economic zone, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall prohibit the importation of all fish products from the
particular fishery concerned and may upon recommendation of the Secre-
tary of State prohibit the importation of all fish products from the nation
involved.8 4
Congress also expressed the view that the United States government
should not recognize the fishery zone of a nation that fails to recognize
traditional United States fishing activities, or management of highly mi-
gratory species by international agreement, or that imposes restrictions on
United States vessels unrelated to conservation.
8 5
TITLE III-NATIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
The national fishery management plans implemented under the act
must be consistent with seven national conservation standards. Conserva-
tion measures should: prevent overfishing and achieve the optimum yield
for each fishery; be based on the best scientific information; provide for
the management of each fish stock as a unit; be nondiscriminatory among
citizens of different States; promote efficiency in resource utilization, but
no measure should have economic allocation as its sole purpose; allow for
variations in fisheries and catches; minimize costs and avoid unnecessary
duplication.86
Eight regional councils 87 are established by the act to ensure that
coastal areas of the United States will have a significant input into the
decision making process for fishery management in their geographical
area. The responsibilities of the councils include preparing fishery man-
agement plans for each fish stock within their jurisdiction, commenting on
foreign permit applications, conducting public hearings on possible con-
servation alternatives, and reassessing optimum yield estimates and
foreign fishing allocation. 88 Designated by the act as voting council
members are the state officials with principal marine fishery management
responsibility, the regional director of the National Marine Fisheries
Service and members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from a list
of qualified individuals submitted by the Governor of each state.8 9 The
84. Id. § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 1825.
85. Id. § 202(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1822(e).
86. Id. § 301(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a).
87. The regional management authorities consist of the New England, Mid-
Atlantic, South Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific, and Western
Pacific Councils. Id. § 302(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a).
88. Id. § 302(h), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h).
89. Id. § 302(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b).
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regional director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the
Commander of the Coast Guard District in that area and a representative of
the State Department will serve on each council in a nonvoting capacity. 9
Every fishery management plan must contain foreign and domestic
fishing conservation regulations, 91 describe in detail the particular fishery
to be regulated,92 evaluate current and future maximum sustainable yield,
determine United States fishing capacity and foreign fishing allocations,
and specify the data the Secretary of Commerce should require fishermen
to submit.93 Discretionary provisions may include fee and permit require-
ments, zonal, seasonal, weight, size, and species limitations, gear restric-
tions, or other measures necessary for effective conservation and manage-
ment. 94
After final formulation, conservation guidelines are submitted to the
Secretary of Commerce for review and approval. 95 The councils are
entitled to written reasons for a partial or total disapproval by the Secretary
and 45 days in which to modify and resubmit the plan. 96 If an initial
management plan is not prepared within a reasonable time or if a disap-
proved plan is not resubmitted, the Secretary of Commerce may prepare
his own management plan or amend the rejected one.97 If the Secretary
develops the program, he must transmit a copy to the council for consid-
eration and comment; recommendations of the council must be made
within 45 days. 98
The Secretary of Commerce must promulgate approved fishery man-
agement plans in the Federal Register and may conduct hearings. 99 After
90. Id. § 302(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(c).
91. Id. § 303(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1).
92. This description should include information on the vessels involved, types
of gear used, species of fish sought, cost of management, expected revenues,
recreational interests in the fishery, and the extent of foreign fishing. Id. § 303(a)(2),
16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(2).
93. Id. § 303(a)(3),(4),(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3),(4), (5).
94. Id. § 303(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b).
95. The plan should be reviewed to determine if it is consistent with the
national standards. The Secretary of Commerce is directed to consult with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is
located in conducting this review. Id. § 304(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b).
96. Id. § 304(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a).
97. Id. § 304(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c).
98. Id., 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c). However, the Secretary may not include a limited
access system without the approval of a majority of voting members of the council
present and voting. Id.
99. Id. § 305(a), (b), 16 U.S.C. § 1855(a), (b).
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considering comments, material presented at the hearings and the consist-
ency of the plan with national standards, the Secretary may promulgate
implementing regulations. " These rules are subject to judicial scrutiny if
a petition for review is filed within 30 days of their promulgation. "0 The
Secretary has the power to bypass normal procedures and implement
regulations for a maximum of 90 days if an emergency in a fish resource
exists.10 2 While the act specifically states it is not intended to diminish a
state's authority within its boundaries, if fishing is conducted both within
and beyond the zone for a particular species or if an act or omission of a
state will substantially and adversely affect a fishery management plan,
the Secretary of Commerce may notify the state and the council of his
intent to regulate the fishery. 03
Enforcement authority is vested in the federal government rather than
the councils or the states. In enforcing the act the Secretary of Commerce
and the Secretary of the Department where the Coast Guard is located"°
may use all facilities, personnel, and equipment of any state or federal
agency (including the Departments of Defense and State).° 5 Authorized
officers may, with or without a warrant, arrest any person reasonably
believed to have committed a violation, board and search any vessel, or
seize any catch or vessel in violation of the act. 106 Criminal penalties or
civil forfeitures may be assessed after a hearing or trial has found a
violation. 107
TITLE IV-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
If the United States ratifies a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty
the Secretary of Commerce may make amendments to the implementing
regulations to conform with the treaty.'08
The Fisherman's Protective Act was amended to extend protection to
United States vessels operating in a fishery zone recognized by the United
100. Id. § 305(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1855(c).
101. Id. § 305(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d).
102. Id. § 305(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1855(e).
103. Id. § 306, 16 U.S.C. § 1856.
104. The Coast Guard is a branch of the Armed Forces at all times and is a
service within the Department of Transportation except when it operates as part of
the Navy in time of war or when the President directs. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS SERVICE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (1976077).
105. FMCA § 311(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1861(a).
106. Id. § 311(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1861(b).
107. Id. §§ 308-10, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1858-60.
108. Id. § 401, 16 U.S.C. § 1881.
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States from seizure based on noncompliance with restrictions unrelated to
conservation or more onerous than the regulations the United States
imposes on foreign fishermen, or on the failure to consider traditional
United States fishing activities, or refusal to allow United States fishermen
equitable access. 109
Foreign Reactions
The initial reaction of foreign nations fishing extensively within 200
miles of the United States coast was to protest the extension of fishery
jurisdiction. In a note to the State Department, Japan declared its "re-
grets" over the legislation and warned that the United States' zone "can
not be determined valid under international law. '"110 The Soviet Union
delivered a "nonpaper" calling the United States' action a direct con-
tradiction to the U.N. L.O.S. Conference."' Potential confrontation be-
tween the United States and nations refusing to comply with the zone had
been a concern of the State Department" 2 as well as the National Security
Council.' 13 The hostilities occurring between Iceland and the United
Kingdom over Iceland's fishery zone extension had not been forgotten. 114
Fortunately, however, even states possessing highly developed distant
water fishing fleets realized the futility of their protests and the disadvan-
tageous bargaining position a 12-mile zone placed them in when trying to
negotiate access to the United States zone.
Thus, Canada," 5 Mexico," 6 Norway, 117 the European Economic
Community" 8 and the Soviet Union 119 enacted their own 200-mile fishery
zones, implicitly ratifying the United States action. Acceptance of the
United States' zone has also been demonstrated by the number of nations
109. Id. § 403, 16 U.S.C. § 1973.
110. Note from the Embassy of Japan to the U.S. Department of State (Apr. 15,
1976).
11I. 2 Marine Fish Management No. 6 at 1 (June 1976). Soviet Union officials
did not sign a formal diplomatic paper, but expressed their disapproval of the U.S.
action just short of a formal diplomatic protest.
112. Hearings on S. 380, S. 1988, and S. 2388, supra note 41, at 450, 791.
113. 2 Marine Fish Management No. 7 at 1 (July 1976).
114. See Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 37
(1973); Katz, Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
83 (1973); Schram, Iceland's 50 Mile Fisheries Zone, 2 Oc. MGMT. 127 (1974).
115. 2 Marine Fish Management No. 6 at 2 (June 1976).
116. Washington Post, August 14, 1976, at 7A.
117. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1976 at 3.
118. Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1976, at 23A.
119. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Dec. 11, 1976 at 6A.
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that have successfully negotiated GIFAs-a prerequisite to consideration
of any foreign application for a fishing permit under the FCMA. Bulgaria,
Romania, Taiwan, East Germany, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Spain, South
Korea, and the European Economic Community have signed GIFAs. 12 °
After extensive negotiations Japan has signed a temporary one-year ver-
sion. '21 Thus, all the major distant water fishing fleets have recognized the
United States' authority to regulate the fisheries within 200 miles of its
coast. Indications are that another tactic for foreign distant water fishing
nations will be the use of joint fishing ventures, companies formed
between American businesses and foreign investors, to exploit the fish
resources within 200 miles of the United States' coast. A recent example is
the agreement between Bellingham Storage Company of Seattle and a
Russian agency to take hake caught off the Washington-Oregon coasts,
process it in Russian vessels, and transport it to Europe for sale.122
The overwhelming response to the United States initiative has been
either adoption of similar legislation or acquiescence by signing a GIFA or
both. This reaction, in addition to prior 200-mile claims means it is only a
matter of time before the 200-mile fishing zone becomes a rule of custom-
ary international law. 12 3 It is probably still too soon to characterize -it as
such because of the varying rights claimed within 200 miles.
Besides affecting foreign fishing efforts off the United States coast,
the FCMA will have repercussions for American fishermen; however,
fishing operations concentrating on highly migratory, sedentary, or anad-
romous species will in reality be faced with few immediate changes.
Impact on Fishing Operations for Highly Migratory Species
The American catch of highly migratory species, primarily tuna, is a
significant portion of the dollar value of the nation's processed fish
products although in terms of percentage of the total fish catch by weight it
is fairly small. 124 The tuna fishing industry operates primarily out of
California and the local economies of many areas in Southern California
are heavily dependent on its success. 121 Since over 90 percent of the
120. 19 Ocean Space News No. 6 at 6 (Feb. 11, 1977).
121. Id.
122. 2 Marine Fish Management No. 8 at 1 (Aug. 1976).
123. See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRITISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 376 (1950), for a discussion of how a rule of customary international law
develops.
124. U.S. Dept. of Commerce Pub. No. 67, Fishery Statistics of the United
States 1973, 37-48 (1976).
125. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on
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United States tuna catch is taken off foreign shores,126 the American Tuna
Boat Association strongly opposed a 200-mile fishing bill for fear that
other nations would exclude them from the prime tuna fishing areas. 127
This analysis was not persuasive since the countries whose coastal waters
are the most popular tuna fishing gounds' 2' have claimed 200-mile
economic zones for years and have periodically harrassed and seized
American tuna vessels in these areas. For example, between 1961 and
1975 Ecuador seized 136 United States tuna boats with 83 seizures
involving the payment of fines and other charges for the release of crew
members. 129
In order to encourage American tuna fishermen to continue operating
under such adverse conditions, the Fisherman's Protective Act was passed
in 1967.130 The Act provides for government reimbursement for fines,
license fees, regulatory fees, or any other direct charges to secure the
return of a vessel or crew members where the vessel has been seized by a
foreign country on the basis of rights in territorial waters or on the high
seas not recognized by the United States. 131 Upon application to the
Secretary of State and the signing of an agreement, the owner of an
illegally seized fishing vessel can be guaranteed reimbursement for actual
costs resulting from damage to or confiscation of the vessel, gear, or
equipment, 3 2 the market value of the fish caught before seizure, confis-
cated or spoiled during detention,1 33 and not more than 50 percent of gross
income lost as a direct result of the seizure.1 34 Government payments to
Extending the Jurisdiction of the United States Beyond the Present 12 Mile Fishery
Zone, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 614-15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation].
126. Id. at 615.
127. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation,
supra note 125, at 440,571; Hearings on S. 380, S. 1988, and S. 2338, supra note 41,
at 470, 477, 727.
128. These nations include Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Nicaragua. See Hearings
on S. 380, S. 1988, and S. 2388, supra note 41, at 741-44.
129. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation,
supra note 125, at 610.
130. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-79 (1967).
131. Id. §§ 1972(a), 1973(a).
132. Id. § 1977(a)(1).
133. Id. § 1977(a)(2).
134. Id. § 1977(a)(3). This determination is to be based on "value of the average
catch per day's fishing during the three most recent calendar years immediately
preceding such seizure and detention of the vessel seized, or if such experience is
not available, then of all commercial fishing vessels of the U.S. engaged in the same
fishery as that of the type and size of the seized vessel." Id.
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United States tuna boat owners between 1967-1975 for Ecuadorian sei-
zures were estimated at more than $4 million. 135 It was probably this
monetary protection the American tuna associations feared losing with the
passage of the 200-mile fishery zone for it would appear to be inconsistent
for the United States to adopt a 200-mile fishery zone and continue to
oppose those of other countries.
To avoid the appearance of inconsistency, the FCMA exempts cover-
age of highly migratory species. 13 6 According to the explanation provided
by the Conference Committee on the FCMA, there is no justification for
coastal nations having jurisdiction over species that spawn and migrate
over great ocean distances. 137 Therefore, the United States considers the
only lawful regulations of highly migratory species those established by
international fishery agreements. 138 This means that the United States will
oppose claims of other countries to control and regulate tuna fishing within
200 miles of their coasts. To encourage American tuna fishermen to
continue present operations, the amended Fisherman's Protective Act 139
will provide payments to tuna boat owners for seizures based on the
violation of a 200-mile fishery zone encompassing highly migratory
species. In theory and current practice the American tuna fisherman will
have the same protection as prior to the adoption of the act; whether in
years to come the United States will expand its fishery zone to include the
regulation of highly migratory species is the new concern of tuna fisher-
men.
Impact on Fishing Operations for Sedentary Species
Sedentary species, unlike highly migratory species, are covered by
the new 200-mile zone; 14° however, this will probably effect little real
change for the sedentary fishing industry. Since the Convention on the
Continental Shelf was adopted the United States has claimed the sovereign
rights over the natural resources of the continental shelf, including seden-
tary species, for the purpose of exploiting them. To better protect these
resources, the Department of State in December of 1974 published a new
135. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation,
supra note 125, at 610.
136. FCMA § 103, 16 U.S.C § 1813 (1976).
137. CONF. COMM. REP. No. 711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1976).
138. S. REP. No. 1079, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1974). United States of
America Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic Zone and Continental Shelf,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L.47, art. 17 (Aug. 8, 1974).
139. FCMA § 403, 22 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). See the text at note 109, supra.
140. See the statement of Findings, Purposes and Policy in id. § 2(b), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1801(b).
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set of guidelines providing for the search and arrest of any foreign vessel
taking continental shelf fishery resources except as provided by bilateral
agreements.14' To determine when an illegal taking has occurred, vessels
can be boarded when they are engaged in fishing above the continental
shelf with gear designed to catch continental shelf resources or fishing
above the continental shelf with bottom gear that can be expected to catch
continental shelf resources.' 42
These new rules were controversial because they were designed to
apply to foreign vessels outside of the U.S. 12-mile exclusive fishery
zone. Foreign nations would undoubtedly have considered such a seizure a
violation of the right to freedom of high seas fishing established in 1958 by
the Geneva Convention on the High Seas. 143 The adoption of the 200-mile
fishing bill ended speculation over the legality and enforceability of these
sedentary fishing regulations by shifting the emphasis to the legality of the
FCMA.
According to some international law scholars, the unilateral exten-
sion of a nation's fishery jurisdiction is a violation of international law
which forbids unilateral or exclusive claims to ocean space beyond the
12-mile contiguous zone. 144 In response to claims that the act is consistent
with developing international trends, the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) decision in the Icelandic Fisheries Case is frequently cited. 145 The
I.C.J., in evaluating Iceland's 50-mile unilateral fishery claim, noted
existing international law did not grant coastal states the right to extend
their jurisdiction unilaterally. 14 Phillip Jessup, former Justice of the
I.C.J., in speaking of the U.N. L.O.S. Conference admitted
there has been much support for agreement on a 200 mile economic
zone, but it is generally recognized that this is a proposal for new law
which can be valid only on the basis of general agreement through
treaty. 147
Supporters of the legislation maintain that the FCMA is legally
acceptable. 148 The law of the sea is a combination of treaty law and
141. 50 C.F.R. § 295.1-.6 (1976).
142. Id.
143. 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (effective Sept. 30,
1962).
144. Hearings Before Armed Services Comm. on S. 961, supra note 51, at
212-14.
145. Id. at 212.
146. International Court of Justice Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United King-
dom v. Iceland) I.C.J. (1974).
147. Hearings Before Armed Services Comm. on S. 961, supra note 51, at 213.
148. Memorandum of Warren G. Magnuson, id. at 151-58.
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customary international law-the latter often developing as the result of
unilateral claims. Since the Geneva Conferences of both 1958 and 1960
failed to establish the extent of the coastal states' fishery jurisdiction,
customary international law was decisive. 149 Almost 40 countries have
extended their fishery jurisdiction beyond 12 miles and there is general
agreement that any new L.O.S. Treaty will provide for some type of
200-mile economic zone.150 In light of the problems faced by the fishing
industry the FCMA is justified as a reasonable action and thus acceptable
in international law. 151 If this view of the FCMA ultimately prevails,
sedentary conservation rules will clearly be permissible within 200 miles
and the only remaining issue will be their enforceability on the continental
shelf extending beyond 200 miles.
Impact on Fishing Operations for Anadromous Species
Anadromous species spend the greatest part of their life cycle on the
high seas coming inland only to spawn. The anadromous species of
greatest importance to the United States is Pacific salmon, although river
herring, shad and Atlantic salmon are of significance to commercial and
recreational fishermen.' 52 Landings of salmon at Pacific coast ports in
1973 were 221.6 million pounds, valued at $127.6 million. 153 This was a 4
percent decrease in quantity from 1972, but an increase of 78 percent in
value.' 54 The quantity decrease was due in part to a virtual failure of
salmon runs in the Bristol Bay area of Alaska because of a kill of young
fish in the cold winters of 1970-72 aggravated by the Japanese catch of
salmon on the high seas. 155
Even though salmon migrate over large areas of the high seas, the
United States has always favored regulation by the coastal state of origin
because of the unique life cycle of the anadromous specie.156 In keeping
with this philosophy, the FCMA provides for the regulation of all anad-
149. Id.
150. Hearings on the Geneva Session, supra note 18, at 2-5.
151. Hearings Before Armed Services Comm. on S. 961, supra note 51, at 154.
See H. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 29 (1959).
152. W. Yonkers, Fisheries Uses of the Sea in LOCAL IMPACTS OF THE LAW OF
THE SEA 68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Yonkers].
153. U.S. Dept. of Commerce Pub. No. 67, Fishery Statistics of the United
States 1973 235-49 (1976).
154. Id. at 235.
155. Id.
156. See United States of America Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L.47, art. 18 (Aug. 8,
1974).
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romous species within 200 miles of the United States coast and throughout
their migratory range except during the time they are within another
nation's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone.'
57
Control and regulation by the state of origin is logical for several
reasons. Salmon return only to the stream of their origin to spawn. High
seas fishing cannot selectively catch salmon from different origin points
because there is no method for distinguishing salmon from different
streams when they are on the high seas. Thus, high seas salmon fishing
might take an entire run from one river system wiping out that river's
salmon. 158 By fishing at the inland stream as the fish return to spawn
adequate escapement can be allowed to ensure sufficient spawners to
continue that run. High seas salmon fishing is also economically ineffi-
cient, taking salmon at an immature stage, approximately 3 pounds,
compared to the five and one-half pounds they weigh at the time of their
return inland. 159 The nation of origin often has a significant economic
investment in the resource. Sizeable expenditures are necessary to keep
the water of the streams pure, a requirement for the eggs' survival, and to
construct fish ladders and spawning channels to aid the fish around
man-made obstacles such as dams.160
As logical and desirable as nation of origin regulation of salmon
throughout their migratory cycle might be, their migration patterns cover
thousands of miles and the practical ability of the United States to prevent
overfishing during the extensive high seas migration is almost nonexistent.
For example, even with an expanded budget the United States Coast
Guard will not be totally effective within 200 miles of the coast because of
the large area involved. 16' Here again the validity of the FCMA in
international law is questioned. Assuming the concept of a 200-mile
fishing zone is accepted as a rule of customary international law, the
provision for enforcement of anadromous regulation on the high seas
thousands of miles from the United States coast would probably never be
accepted by other nations. American proposals at the Law of the Sea
Conference for coastal state regulation of anadromous species met with
157. FCMA § 102(2), 22 U.S.C. § 1812(2) (1976).
158. Yonkers, supra note 152, at 68.
159. Id. at 69.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation,
supra note 125, at 206; 2 Marine Fish Management No. 5 at 2 (May 1976). For an
estimate of the costs of enforcement see Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, supra note 125, at 212-32.
1977]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
considerable disagreement from non-host nations' 62 who insisted that
since salmon gain 90 percent of their weight on the high seas, the
international community should have the right to harvest them.'
63
In actuality it is likely that fishing for anadromous species will
continue to be regulated by treaties among interested nations similar to the
Convention on the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean Be-
tween the United States, Canada, and Japan. 16 In this tripartite agreement
Japan and Canada agreed to abstain from salmon fishing in designated
high seas areas.' 65 While the United States has announced its intent to
withdraw from the Convention," 6 similar measures will probably be
renegotiated under the aegis of the FCMA. The expanded United States
fishing zone may have made the negotiation of such bilateral or multilater-
al agreements on salmon conservation easier since nations willing to
cooperate to preserve anadromous species can be rewarded with greater
access to the United States zone for taking other species. In the event a
nation still will not cooperate with the United States on anadromous
conservation efforts the United States' power and readiness to regulate and
protect the species on the high seas might be a sufficiently credible threat
to prompt cooperation.
Impact on the Coastal Fishing Industry
The coastal fishing industry was one of the main groups lobbying for
an extension of the United States fishing zone and hopes to benefit the
most from the new legislation. 167 The coastal fishing industry is generally
characterized by old, inefficient vessels and equipment that are expensive
to maintain, long hours, low wages, and marginal profitability. 168 Declin-
ing profitability has generally been blamed on the increasingly sophisti-
cated foreign fleets operating off the United States coast depleting the fish
162. See Denmark: Draft Article on Anadromous Species, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/C. 2/L.37 (August 5, 1974); Japan: Draft Article on Anadromous Species, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.46 (Aug. 8, 1974).
163. Official Records of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Caracas, Session II, Vol II, (June 20-Aug. 29, 1974), Representative of Denmark at
220.
164. 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. 2786 (in force June 12, 1953).
165. Id. See Annex (1)(c) and (2).
166. The Kansas City Star, Feb. 14, 1977 at 5.
167. Hearings on S. 1988, supra note 43, at 112-13; Hearings on Extending the
Jurisdiction of the U.S. Beyond the Present 12-mile Fishery Zone Before the Sub-
comm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36, 42, 66, 123, 129,
188, 245, 270, 475, 513, 516, 529-32, 560-65, 577, 843-88 (1974).
168. H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975).
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stock. From 1952-60 the American catch from waters off New England
averaged 700 million pounds or 99 percent of the total catch from the
area. 169 By 1969 the Soviet fishing fleets were taking over 800 million
pounds or 50 percent of the total catch from those waters.' 70 At the same
time the American catch fell to 25 percent of the area's harvest. 17' The
figures off the Northwest coast and Alaska show similar large scale
foreign efforts. The National Marine Fisheries Service has initially con-
centrated on developing preliminary management plans implementing
limited access to the United States' zone for foreign fishermen, 172 but
regulation of these massive fishing fleets will probably not have an
immediate effect on the American coastal fishing industry since depleted
fish stock will need time to recover. While regulations on the entry of
foreign fishermen may improve the profitability of the coastal industry, in
the long run the regional councils will probably adopt a limited entry
system for domestic fishermen 173 to further improve conservation efforts
and enable the United States' industry to operate as efficiently and as
profitably as their foreign counterparts.
Impact on the Gulf Coast Fishing Industry
The 200-mile fishing bill has had a much more immediate impact on
the Gulf Coast shrimpers whose shrimp catch off the Mexican coast
amounted to 25 million dollars last year. " Following the United States'
lead, Mexico extended its fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles, and in order to
regulate the fishermen in each other's zone, Mexico and the United States
negotiated a bilateral agreement. For American shrimpers the agreement
set catch limits at 6 million pounds for 1977, down 4 million pounds from
1976, reduced the number of American boats to 318 in 1977 with follow-
ing years cuts to 225 vessels, 127, and 95, and established a license fee of
169. Hearings on S. 380, S. 1988, and S. 2388, supra note 41, at 863-98.
170. Id. at 81.
171. Id.
172. 2 Marine Fish Mangement No. 7 at 3 (July 1976). The National Marine
Fisheries Service has undertaken this effort in case: (1) of a signed and approved
GIFA, (2) of applications from foreign nations for permits and (3) no fish manage-
ment -plan is prepared by the council on March 1, 1977. It is not the intent of the
agency to limit the options of the regional councils by making these preliminary
plans.
173. For a discussion of the methods and legal problems of a limited entry
system see, H. Knight & J. Lambert, Legal Aspects of Limited Entry for Commer-
cial Marine Fisheries (Oct. 15, 1975).
174. Associated Press Release, Austin American Statesman, Aug. 10, 1976.
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$2006 per boat. 7 5 By 1980 American fishing within 200 miles of the
Mexican coast will be phased out entirely. 
176
The president of a Texas shrimpers' association is certain a more
advantageous agreement could have been obtained if the United States had
threatened a tariff or embargo on imported shrimp if Mexico would not
agree to more favorable access conditions. 177 However, State Department
and National Marine Fisheries Service officials contend the United States
obtained a more favorable agreement than was once anticipated. T17 Ac-
cording to the Executive Director of the Texas Shrimpers Association, the
shrimping industry will not be hurt by the agreement as much as had been
predicted. 179 Federal sources agree; they estimate that only a few hundred
of the more than 8000 United States shrimp boats in the Gulf depend
heavily on Mexican waters for their catch.18 0 Federal statistics further
show that of the 208 million pounds of shrimp caught in the Gulf last year
not more than 10 million pounds were caught within 200 miles of Mex-
ico. 8' Even though these federal figures have been challenged, Gulf
shrimpers have probably been hurt much more by the rising fuel and labor
costs that were already pricing American fishermen out of competition
with foreign fishermen. 1
82
The economic and conservation problems that lead to the enactment
of the FCMA have not resulted solely from foreign fishing activities, but
stem from the very nature of the fisheries as a common property resource.
For years the United States has lacked a jurisdictional or statutory basis
from which to develop and enforce a unified fishery management plan. By
treating fishery resources within 200 miles as private rather than common
property, the FCMA should be able to provide the authority for the sound
management of one of our most valuable resources-the fisheries.
Sarah Weckel Hays
175. 2 Marine Fish Management No. 8 at 8 (Aug. 1976).
176. Associated Press Release, Houston Chronicle, Sept. 21, 1976.
177. Id.
178. 2 Marine Fish Management No. 8 at 8 (Aug. 1976).
179. Associated Press Release, Brazosport Facts, Aug. 11, 1976.
180. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1976 at 20.
181. Id.
182. Id.
